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CASE COMMENTS
which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Government
shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery or inspection until said wit-
ness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case."1
58
In conclusion, it would seem fair to say that the rule declared in
Jencks was neither drastic nor novel, but in reality involved the clari-
fication of principles already established. 59 It is hoped that any pro-
cedural weakness in the decision, or any concern with regard thereto,
has been alleviated by the recent Congressional enactment on this
subject. Although pre-trial disclosure in this field has been prohibited
by the new law, both the Jencks case and the attendant legislation,
properly applied, should preserve to the criminal defendant the
due process of law granted by the fifth amendment. 60
J. HARDIN MARION, III
FORGOTTEN INSURANCE POLICIES IN
DIVORCE CASES
The determination of rights to life insurance proceeds, subse-
quent to divorce, is the basis for unnecessary litigation.' The cases
usually arise as a result of the former wife remaining as the named
beneficiary following a property settlement between the parties. Spe-
cial significance attaches to this problem where the decree of divorce
incorporates a property agreement which does not refer to insurance.
The Wisconsin case of Spalding v. Williams2 points up the com-
plexity of such a situation. At the time of divorce, after three years
of marriage, Doris Williams Spalding and Raymond Spalding entered
into a stipulation covering their property. The judgment of divorce
incorporated this stipulation, which was intended to be a full, final
rPub. L. No. 269, 85 th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3500(a) (Sept. 2, 1957), 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 35oo(a). (Emphasis added).
1w'The Jencks case does not introduce any revolutionary principles into the
trial of criminal cases. The case enunciates a simple, fair and quite limited rule."
United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
10See io3 Cong. Rec. 15052-55 (daily ed. Aug. 29, 1957).
'It is the basis for settlement even more than for litigation. See Moody, In-
surance in Divorce Cases: Unsettled Rights Mean Future Litigation, 41 A.B.A.J.
315 (1955), for practical suggestions from the general attorney for a large life
insurance company for solving insurance problems subsequent to a divorce.
275 Wis. 394, 82 N.W.2d 187 (1957).
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and complete property settlement, in lieu of alimony, between the
parties. The wife was to receive specified personal effects and cash,
while the husband assumed certain financial responsibilities and was
awarded all the rest of the property. There was no listing of the
specific property awarded to the husband. Neither the property stip-
ulation nor the divorce decree referred to the insurance policies
which became the subject of litigation. Sixteen days after the divorce,
the husband was killed in an automobile collision. Two insurance
policies were found in the glove compartment of the wrecked automo-
bile. The policies contained clauses reserving the right to change the
beneficiaries upon notification in writing to the company. In them
the wife was named as the primary beneficiary and Charles Spalding,
Raymond's father, was named as the contingent beneficiary. The wife
refused to release her claim to the proceeds. Thereupon the father, in-
dividually and as administrator of the estate of Raymond F. Spalding,
commenced an action against the former wife and the insurance
companies for the proceeds. Under an agreement of all parties to the
proceedings the insurance companies paid the proceeds into court
pending termination of the action and were dismissed as party defen.
dants.
3
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the policy provision
for a change of beneficiary was not exclusive. The wife could divest
herself of her interest by her own act under certain circumstances as
provided by statute.4 Moreover, another section gives a court having
jurisdiction of such property in a divorce action the power to "divide
and distribute the estate, both real and personal, of the husband and
so much of the estate of the wife as shall have been derived from the
husband, between the parties and divest and transfer the title of any
thereof accordingly .. ." The court states that her interest in the
insurance policies is property obviously derived from the husband,6
since it was he who originally named her as beneficiary and thereafter
possessed the power to name a new beneficiary.
The wife's interest in the insurance policies, the court noted, was
subject to reinstatement by the husband. Not only was there no show-
'The nature of the insurance business makes it probable that many of these
cases will arise in federal courts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 for applicability of inter-
pleader in the federal system. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, and 2361 (1952),
to which Rule 22 is an addition rather than a limitation. A statement of requisites
in order to invoke the Federal Interpleader Act is given in Federal Life Ins. Co. v.
Tietsort, 131 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 768 (1942).
'Wis. Stat. § 246.11 (1955).
5Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1955).
882 N.W.2d at 189.
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ing of the husband's intention to give the wife an interest, but the
action of the deceased in placing the policies in the glove compart-
ment of his automobile showed a contrary intention. This action,
according to the court, was sufficient to compel "an inference that
he did so with the intention of changing the beneficiary." 7 The court
distinguished several recent *isconsin cases which would have in-
dicated a contrary result. It was held in Wolfe v. Jebes that the con-
tingent interest of the wife as the beneficiary of her husband's life
insurance was not properly the subject of a property stipulation and
such an instrument could give him no greater rights than he al-
ready enjoyed-the right to change the beneficiary. Under Hott v.
Warner,9 if the right to change the beneficiary has not been exercised
at death, then the named beneficiary's position is-analogous to a bene-
ficiary under a policy in which no right to change the beneficiary has
been reserved. In the principal case, emphasis was placed on the short
time lapse of only sixteen days between the divorce and death, while
in the previous cases, periods of thirteen years, in Wolfe v. Jebe, and
seven years, in Hott v. Warner, had expired.
In the absence of a statute10 or a contrary provision in the policy,
all courts agree that divorce is not ipso facto sufficient to bar a former
7Id. at 19o.
242 Wis. 650, 9 N.V.2d 124 (1943).
'268 Wis. 264, 67 N.W.2d 370 (1954). See Christman v. Christman, 163 Wis. 433,
157 N.W. 1o99, loo (1916), decided under a 1915 statute, which held the wife's in-
terest to the proceeds vested at death. Therefore, that court decided the former hus-
band's attempt to name a new beneficiary by his will was unsuccessful.
"Different results are realized through statutes. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.065 (1955)
makes possible the restoration of property obtained directly or indirectly from or
through one spouse back to that spouse. It has the effect of depriving the wife of
any right to insurance proceeds. For a criticism of this statute see Note, 34 Ky. L.
Rev. 2 1 (1946), which questions the applicability of such a statute to insurance. Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 452.090 (1949) deprives the guilty party of property derived from and
by virtue of the marriage. Mich. Stat. § 552.101 (1948) divests the wife by opera-
tion of law in all instances where the parties to the divorce have failed to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity to make an agreement between themselves as to the
ownership of the policy. This statute is discussed in the text at n. 40. Texas is the
only state having a statute that requires a continuing insurable interest in order for
the beneficiary to take the proceeds. However, Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. Insurance Code,
art. 349-1 (Vernon Supp. 1954), has mitigated the drastic effect of the Texas rule by
allowing a beneficiary who originally had an insurable interest to take the proceeds,
although the insurable interest is terminated before the policy matures. The first case
to construe the new Texas statute was McCain v. Yost, 284 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1955).
The effect of that case on Texas law is discussed in Note, 34 Tex. L. Rev. io99 (1956).
For a text survey of statutory enactments see 2 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance
Law § 44oh at 1272-1275 (1929).
19581
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spouse from recovering." There is no doubt that the wife may sur-
render her rights as beneficiary by an express agreement with the
husband.12 Voluntary settlements between the parties are favored
by the law and if free from fraud, misrepresentation, deceit or con-
cealment are usually upheld.13 However, courts have reached di-
vergent results when determining the wife's remaining rights to the
insurance proceeds where property settlements are the substance of
these actions.' 4 Courts must consider two related problems: first,
whether rights to insurance proceeds expected at a future date are
properly the subject of the agreement;' 5 and, secondly, whether the
"Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Tietsort, 131 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 768 (1942); Tromp v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 143 Kan. 98, 53 P.2d
831 (1936); Wallace v. Mut. Benefit Life Insurance Co., 97 Minn. 27, io6 N.W. 84
(19o6); Kurtz v. Dickson, 194 Va. 957, 76 S.E.2d 219 (1953); 2 Couch, Cyclopedia of
Insurance Law § 44oh at 1271 (1929); 1 Richards, Insurance § io8 (5th ed. 1952);
Note, 34 Ky. L. Rev. 221 (1946); Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1220, 1224 (1948); Annot., 52
A.L.R. 386, 389 (1928); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 1309 (1940).
'Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14o N.E.2d 89 (Ohio
C.P. 1956); 1 Richards, Insurance § io8 (5 th ed. 1952); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance
§ 1309 (1940). See 14o N.E.2d, supra, at 91, which quotes from 29 Am. Jur. 977-78,
stating that the power of a former spouse to relinquish rights to insurance policies
on a former spouse's life is a well recognized exception to the general rule that
divorce does not affect the right of a former spouse to take the proceeds as bene-
ficiary at maturity. See also United Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Price, 46 Wash. 2d
529, 283 P.2d 119, 122 (1955), questionably relying on Meherin v. Meherin, 99
Cal. App. 2d 596, 222 P.2d 305 (195o), as holding that the wife may divest herself
by agreement of all interest as beneficiary, although no divorce follows the agree-
ment and no power is reserved to change the beneficiary. Some courts consider
the agreement either as an equitable assignment of the proceeds or an estoppel. See
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Quay, 115 F. Supp. 63, 67 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
nThe validity of these agreements is conditioned upon the wife's being fully
apprised of the nature and extent of the marital rights she is surrendering. Con-
necticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Hartshorn, 238 F.2d 417 (gth Cir. 1956);
27 C.J.S., Divorce § 3o (194o); see Brown v. Brown, 265 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1954). The
burden of proving all the required elements rests upon the party relying on the
agreement. Potter's Ex'r v. Potter, 234 Ky. 769, 29 S.W.2d 15 (1930). See also Annot.,
27 A.L.R.2d 883 (1953).
Once the property agreement is incorporated into the divorce decree, it be-
comes more than an agreement between the parties; it is a judicial disposition of
the property with the rights of the parties thereafter resting on the court decree
rather than on the property agreement. The decree vests title in the designated
spouse and simultaneously divests the other spouse of all interest in the property.
United Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Price, 46 Wash. 2d 529, 283 P.2d 119 (1955).
'See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1220, 1230 (1948); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 386, 400 (1928); 2
Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 44oh at 65, notes 17-20 (Supp. 1957); Lindey,
Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 18 at 181 (Cumin. Supp. 1954-
57); 1 Richards, Insurance § io8 (Cumin. Supp. 1956).
'5Generally, the significant language will be whether the separation agreement
purports to include all property that "he may own," "arose out of the marital
relationship," or is in fact broad enough to cover "the entire estate of the former
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language in the particular agreement under consideration is ade-
quate to be interpreted as a waiver of such rights by the beneficiary.' 6
The courts seem to have some difficulty' 7 in defining the nature of
the wife's interest, but the better reasoned decisions have held that
her interest in a policy naming her as beneficiary, subject to revoca-
tion, is only an expectancy.'s Her position is analogous to that of a
spouses." The first clause is seen in Hott v. Warner, 268 Wis. 264, 67 N.W.2d 370
(1954). The second clause is illustrated in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Soluri, 134 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and in Hergenrather v. State Mut.
Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, 79 Ohio App. iL6, 68 N.E.2d 833 (1946). The final
all-inclusive clause is represented in Spalding v. Williams, 275 Wis. 394, 82 N.W.2d
187 (1957), and in Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14o N.E.2d
89 (Ohio C.P. 1956), which also discusses the difference between the last two
clauses. However, as pointed out in the Hague case, supra, at 93, the problem of the
forgotten insurance policy cannot be solved without considering the collateral facts
in conjunction with the language of the agreement. Also see the text at n. 24-28.
2'See text at n. S0-33. Many of the cases cited in this note are from jurisdictions
having community property laws. However, when the wife is the named bene-
ficiary under her husband's life insurance policies, the policy and also the pro-
terest to the wife. If the designation of a beneficiary is subject to change by the
ceeds become the wife's separate property. Although the premiums come from
community property, it is presumed that the husband has made a gift of his in-
insured, her rights do not become perfected until his death. An exception to the
general rule exists in Texas, where the proceeds are held to be the separate property
of the husband. i de Funiak, Principles of Community Property §§ 79, 123, and
233 (1943). Moreover, when the court's decree in granting a divorce to the parties
takes notice of an outside agreement to settle the community property interests,
such a decree is a final determination of the relative rights to the community
property and is not subject even to collateral attack. i de Funiak, supra, at § 231.
See Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841, 842 (1945), where it was held
that the former wife could waive her community interests in the policy and still
take the proceeds as the named beneficiary. For a comprehensive survey, by states,
of the community property system and its effect upon life insurance principles, see
Annot., 168 A.L.R. 342 (1947), supplementing Annot., 114 A.L.R. 545 (1938). For
material thoroughly treating the whole field of life insurance within community
property states, see Catlett, Status of the Proceeds of Life Insurance Under the Com-
munity Property System, 5 Wash. L. Rev. 45 (1930); Huie, Community Property
Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 17 Tex. L. Rev. 121 (193o), 18 Tex. L. Rev.
121 (193o). 1 de Funiak, supra, § 233 at 663 concludes that the problem is solved
under the laws pertaining to insurance rather than under the rules of community
property.
7Cf. Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14o N.E.2d 89, 91
(Ohio C.P. 1956), pointing to the rights the insured has in policies of insurance
upon his own life as an additional source of difficulty.
TBaekgaard v. Carreiro, 237 F.2d 459 (9 th Cir. 1956); Merchant's Nat. Bank of
Mobile v. Hubbard, 220o Ala. 375, 125 So. 335 (1929); Sandrosky v. Prudential In-
surance Co., 217 Cal. 578, 20 P.2d 325 (1933); Equitable Life v. Stilley, 271 Ill.
App. ,83 (1933); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 1276 (1940); Lindey, Separation Agree-
ments and Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 18 at 332 (rev. ed. 1953). Cf. Cohen v. Samuels,
245 U.S. 5o (1917), in which the trustee in bankruptcy prevailed over the beneficiaries,
securing the cash surrender value of policies in which there was a right to change
the beneficiary.
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legatee under a will, both of whom possess an expectancy of a gift
at the time of death.1 9 If at death, the insured has not taken ad-
vantage of his privilege to choose a new beneficiary, and the wife has
not been otherwise deprived of her interest, his estate should not be
allowed to exercise it for him to the detriment of the named benefi-
ciary, whose rights became vested upon the happening of the event in-
sured against.2 0
The Spalding court considered the wife's interest in the insurance
proceeds as being derived through the husband.2' However, courts
that are hesitant to infer intent usually state that her rights arise
from the contract of insurance itself22 rather than the marital re-
lationship.23 Therefore, the beneficiary's interest is not the type of
property contemplated in a property settlement,24 but rather a type of
interest whose alienation should be subject to the established prin-
ciples of contract law.25 Even these courts admit that the wife's right
to the insurance proceeds may be abrogated by a property settlement.20
But, as this right is not a property right it is not embraced within an
instrument purporting to settle marital rights unless specifically in-
cluded, or the language used is strong enough necessarily to imply
"Baekgaard v. Carreiro, 237 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1956); Grimm v. Grimm, 26
Cal. 2d 178, 157 P.2d 841 (1945).
"OAndrews v. Andrews, 97 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1938); John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Dawson, 278 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Mo. App. 1955); Equitable Life v. Stilley,
271 Ill. App. 28g ('933); Simmons v. Simmons, 272 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954);
cf. Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14o N.E.2d 89 (Ohio C.P.
1956).
182 N.W.2d at 189.
"John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Soluri, 134 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Merchant's Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 22o Ala. 375, 125 So. 35
(1929); Hergenrather v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, 79 Ohio App.
116, 68 N.E.2d 83 (1946); Simmons v. Simmons, 272 S.V.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954)-
OFederal Life Ins. Co. v. Tietsort, 131 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 768 (1942); Merchant's Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 220 Ala. 375, 125
So. 35 (1929); Tromp v. National Life Ins. Co., 143 Kan. 98, 58 P.2d 831 (1936);
Wallace v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 27, io6 N.W. 84 (19o6); Simmons v.
Simmons, 272 S.W.2d 913 (Tex Civ. App. 1954); Kurtz v. Dickson, 194 Va. 957, 76
S.E.2d 219 (1953).
24Sandrosky v. Prudential Insurance Co., 217 Cal. 578, 20 P.2d 325 (1933);
Equitable Life v. Stilley, 271 Ill. App. 283 (1933).
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Soluri, 134 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Heidrick, 135 N.J. Eq. 326,
38 A.2d 442 (1942); Hergenrather v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, 79
Ohio App. 116, 68 N.E.2d 888 (1946); Kurtz v. Dickson, 194 Va. 957, 76 S.E.2d 219
(1958).
"See note 12 supra.
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such an intention.27 If not included, the rights arising from the pol-
icy must be determined at a later date as if the parties were never
married.
28
In deciding whether the parties have successfully terminated the
wife's interest in the insurance policies, courts must consider each case
on its own facts,2 9 keeping several general rules in mind. This is
stressed in Miller v. Miller,30 which reviews the conflict in the Cali-
fornia cases thus: "It would seem from these cases that, where such a
settlement agreement covers all of the property of the parties and the
wife, in accepting certain provisions for her benefit, fully releases
the husband with respect to all other property, such a release would
ordinarily cover and include her interest as named beneficiary under
an insurance policy; and that where the language used is not broad
enough to include such an interest, or where an intent appears to ex-
clude such rights as a present part of the settlement, the wife will still
take as beneficiary if the policy so provides." 31
The intent of the parties is the criterion used in determining
whether the wife's interest has been abrogated by the property agree-
ment when the insurance policies are not specifically referred to there-
in.32 This intent may be inferred from the wording of the agreement,
"Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Hartshorn, 238 F.2d 417, 422 (9 th
Cir. 1956); Throp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38, 41 (1953); Miller v. Miller,
94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 221 P.2d 357, 360 (1949). See In re Crane, 6 Cal. 2d 218,
57 P.2d 476, 1o4 A.L.R. 11o (1936); Wallace v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 97 Minn.
27, io6 N.W. 84, 86 (1906) (concurring opinion); Lindey, Separation Agreements and
Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 18 text at n. 4 (rev. ed. 1953).
ICf. Townsend v. Huntzinger, 41 Ind. App. 223, 83 N.E. 619, 620 (1908).
'Miller v. Miller, 94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211 P.2d 357 (1949); United Benefit Life
Insurance Co. v. Price, 46 Wash. 2d 529, 283 P.2d 119 (1955).
"'94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211 P.2d 357, 360 (1949).
aIbid. This concept has been stated with much regularity. See Baekgaard v.
arreiro, 237 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1956); Mayberry v. Kathan, 232 F.2d 54, 55
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Throp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38, 40 (1953).
2Miller v. Miller, 94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211 P.2d 357, 360 (1949). The cases gen-
erally disclose that the courts are trying to carry out the intentions of the parties.
Although not referred to in the decisions, courts seem to recognize the frailties
of human behavior in negligently postponing matters such as making a change
of beneficiary. Thus, if given any evidence from which they can infer an intention
to change the beneficiary, courts are hesitant to rule otherwise. See Prudential In-
surance Co. of America v. Quay, 115 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D. Cal. 1953). There the court
held that the giving of a power of attorney by the former wife to her former hus-
band to use in effecting a change of beneficiary, although never exercised, repre-
sented a sufficient excess of caution by the latter to negative any possibility that he
desired his former wife to have the proceeds. But see John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Soluri, 134 F. Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), which shows a reluc-
tance to dispute the right of the beneficiary: "'If a court were authorized to guess
rather than to rule on the facts before it, one might surmise that the deceased
1958]
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giving adequate consideration to its objective, and from circum-
stances regarding the relationship of the parties before, during, and
after divorce.33 Unless the wife's waiver of future expectancies is
clearly expressed, or the language otherwise indicates such an intent,
courts will not construe general clauses or phrases in settlement agree-
ments as extinguishing her interest as beneficiary.
34
If the insured failed to act following a property settlement agree-
ment which refers to his existing right to change the beneficiary,
courts will allow the former wife to continue as the named beneficiary
and take the proceeds.3 5 Moreover, if the separation agreement re-
quires the wife to discharge certain duties to aid the husband in effect-
ing a change of beneficiary, and he does not call upon her to per-
form, 6 or else he does not act to complete the transaction after she
does perform,37 then she is not barred from taking the proceeds. The
theory evidently is that the agreement in such a situation gives the
insured an option that he may use to control the ultimate ownership
of the proceeds.38 Provisions of this type do not force him to take any
action, nor are they self-executing; 39 therefore, to change title to the
proceeds by law after his death can frustrate the insured's true in-
tention, or violate his undeniable right to grant more to his former
wife as a matter of bounty.
4°
wife would not have intended that her former husband should continue to benefit
from the supplementary contract. But even of that guess we cannot be too sure ....
Perhaps it is just as well that we do not rely on the guess as distinguished from the
fact for which there is evidence.' "
'Merchant's Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 22o Ala. 375, 125 So. 335 (1929).
3'Miller v. Miller, 94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211 P.2d 357 (1949); Grimm v. Grimm, 26
Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945). See In re Crane, 6 Cal. 2d 218, 57 P.2d 476, 104
A.L.R. 11oi (1936). See also United Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Price, 46 Wash. 2d
529, 283 P.2d 119, 122 (1955): "'A wife as beneficiary under an insurance policy re-
tains her status as such unless it clearly appears from the agreement that in addi-
tion to the segregation of the property of the spouses, it was intended to deprive
her of the right to take under the insurance contract as beneficiary. Such rights
are waived only when it appears that the intention of the parties was directed to
such expectancies and their intention to disclaim future rights that might develop
from such expectancies was made clear in the contract.'"
1,Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945).
mlbid.
'John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Dawson, 278 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1955).
'Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841, 844 (1945).
'Ibid.
4 0Id. at 843. See In re Crane, 6 Cal. 2d 218, 57 P.2d 476, 478, 1O4 A.L.R.
1101, 1103 (1936), which is quoted in the Grimm case, supra, at 843 as follows:
"If the testator had not executed this will until after the date of the property
settlement agreement, it would not be reasonable to say that he was without right to
make such subsequent will and thereby give additional property to his wife. But
in substance and effect he did the same thing by leaving his will unchanged...."
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Admittedly, attorneys should be careful to settle clearly and cer-
tainly the property rights of the parties to a separation agreement. How-
ever, the possibility of nondisclosure by clients in such instances should
not be overlooked. It would seem that final responsibility for dearly
administering the relative rights of separating spouses as to any in-
surance policies they may own, although not revealed, rests with the
trial judges.
A statute requiring trial judges to incorporate into every decree
of divorce a determination of all rights to any existing insurance on
the husband's life would be a workable solution. Moreover, the prob-
lem of the forgotten insurance policy could be solved by having the
statute operate to transfer ownership of the proceeds even though for
some unexplained reason the decree remained silent as to insurance
policies. Michigan has such a statute. There, the legislature has placed
a duty on the courts in every decree of divorce to:
"[D]etermine all rights of the wife in and to the proceeds of any
policy or contract of life insurance, endowment or annuity upon the
life of the husband in which she was named or designated as bene-
ficiary, or to which she became entitled by assignment or change of
beneficiary during the marriage or in anticipation thereof, whether
such contract or policy was heretofore or shall hereafter be written
or become effective, and unless otherwise ordered in said decree such
policy or contract shall thereupon become and be payable to the estate
of the husband or to such named beneficiary as he shall affirmatively
designate." 4' Moreover, the Michigan statute does not prevent the
"lMich. Comp. Laws § 552.101 (1948). "552.o-Divorce decree; provision in lieu
of dower; determination of rights of wife in insurance policy.
"Sec. x. When any decree of divorce is hereafter granted in any of the courts
of this state, it shall be the duty of the court granting such decree to include
in it a provision in lieu of the dower of the wife in the property of the husband,
and such provision shall be in full satisfaction of all claims that the wife may have
in any property which the husband owns or may thereafter own, or in which
he may have any interest.
"Hereafter every decree of divorce shall determine all rights of the wife in
and to the proceeds of any policy or contract of life insurance, endowment or an-
nuity upon the life of the husband in which she was named or designated as
beneficiary, or to which she became entitled by assignment or change of beneficiary
during the marriage or in anticipation thereof, whether such contract or policy
was heretofore or shall hereafter be written or become effective, and unless other-
wise ordered in said decree such policy or contract shall thereupon become and be
payable to the estate of the husband or to such named beneficiary as he shall
affirmatively designate: Provided, That the company issuing such policy or con-
tract shall be discharged of all liability thereon by payment of its proceeds in
accordance with its terms, unless before such payment the company shall have
written notice, by or on behalf of the insured or the estate of the insured or i of the
heirs of the insured, or any other person having an interest in such policy or con-
tract of a claim thereunder and the aforesaid divorce."
1958]
